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COMPENSATION FOR MOVING EXPENSES OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
The rule that the owner of condemned property is not entitled to
compensation for the cost of moving personal property from premises
that have been condemned has been repeatedly sustained by the over-
whelming majority of the cases involving eminent domain proceed-
ings.' The primary basis of the rule is that the loss incurred is not a
taking, even though incurring such moving costs may result in sub-
stantial hardship to the owner.2 Furthermore, these costs are said to
be already included in the fair market value paid,3 and are too specu-
lative and hypothetical 4 to be computed accurately and too expensive
to compensate. 5 Also, they are said to be only collateral and inci-
dental to the valuation of the total take.6 However, courts are in-
creasingly recognizing the harshness of this rule, and although it has
not been overturned, it is more often criticized.7
In the thirteen year period of 1949 through 1961 there were 1,012
urban renewal projects in the United States as compared to the almost
equal number of 935 projects in the six year span of 1962 through
1967.8 The number of highway construction contracts awarded has
steadily increased from $917,000,000 in 1947 to $5,512,000,000 in 1967.9
1 4 P. NICHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DoiVN § 14.2471(2) (4th ed.
1962) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]; 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW
or EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 66-80 (2nd ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as ORGEL].
2 See Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1922); Central Pac.
R.R. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247 (1868). But see Comment, Eminent Domain
Valuation in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Eminent Domain Valuation], for an attack on the
premise that there is a constitutional requirement only to compensate for
property taken, to the exclusion of incidental costs such as moving expenses.
3 See, e.g., In re Gratiot Ave., 294 Mich. 569, 577, 293 N.W. 755, 758
(1940). See discussion in text accompanying notes 23-31 infra.
4 See, e.g., In re Gratiot Ave., 294 Mich. 569, 577, 293 N.W. 755, 758
(1940). See discussion in text accompanying notes 26-29 infra.
5 Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent
Domain, 48 VA. L.J. 437 (1962).
6 See, e.g., Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923); Central
Pac. R.R. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247 (1868).
7 Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 385 (1945)
(concurring opinion); Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 171 Cal.
392, 398, 153 P. 705, 707 (1915), where the court said: "We are not to be
understood as saying that this should not be the law when we do say that is
not our law."; Newark v. Cook, 99 N.J. Eq. 527, 538, 133 A. 875, 879 (ch. 1926),
where the court said: "That is the law. It works hardships."8 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
714 (1968).
9 Id. at 543.
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Because of this expanding condemnation activity there will be greater
movement of households and greater hardship suffered by those who
are displaced. It is the purpose of this note to examine the validity of
the majority rule in order to determine whether California can find a
reasonable and less harsh alternative.
Historical Background in the United States and England
The historical background of eminent domain compensation gives
an insight into the reason for the present-day refusal of compensation
for moving expenses.10 "Denial of recovery for consequential loss in
eminent domain proceedings cannot be attributed entirely to history.
In part it seems the product of present and conscious decision."" Yet,
history has played a significant role.
Because of the rural character of early American life, condemna-
tion did not result in the incurring of significant moving expenses. 2
Rarely did the condemnation necessitate the taking of the dwelling,
as customarily there was substantial adjacent farm land that could
adequately serve the project of the condemning authority.13 In the
southern states, originally there was not even a duty to compensate
at all for unimproved land. Its value, in relation to the obligation to
the state, was said to be so small that its taking was not considered to
be damage.'4 The growth and development of the country necessi-
tated the removal of all possible burdens to industrial progress.15
The situation in England was far different. 16 As a by-product of
10 See 2 NiCHOLS § 6.4; Eminent Domain Valuation 65.
11 Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent
Domain, 48 VA. L.J. 437, 450 (1962).
12 C. McCommcx, HANDBOOK Or THE LAw OF DAMAGES 541 n.28 (1935):
"Such damage is likely to be less important also in pioneer rural conditions
than in present day urban surroundings."; Comment, The Public Use Limita-
tion on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem 58 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1949).
13 See Comment, Real Property-Eminent Domain-Time for Fixing
Damages-Super-Highway Construction, 1 VLL. L. REv: 105 (1956):
"Many of the issues and problems which confront the courts at the present
time were raised originally in the pre-Revolutionary War area of private
turnpike construction. However, it has become apparent that the legal prin-
ciples and procedural rules that were used to settle disputes in that period
were not designed to cope with the problems raised by our modem urban and
rural development.... Another source of law which might be thought appli-
cable to the problem at hand is that which grew up with the construction of
the railroads. Again, however, the rules were unsatisfactory, since most of the
railroads were built through barren, undeveloped lands.... Modem turn-
pikes, on the other hand, usually cut through privately owned land which is
intensely developed.... Hence, some new procedures are to be desired."
14 See State v. Dawson, 3 Hill 100 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1836); Comment, The
Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
L.J. 599, 600 n.6 (1949); Eminent Domain Valuation 65.
15 See generally Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Do-
main: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 601-02 (1949).
10 See generally 2 NicHOLS § 6.41; Eminent Domain Valuation 65-66.
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the Industrial Revolution, land in England was more developed indus-
trially and commercially, so that it was far more scarce and more val-
uable than in the United States. The English did not have extensive
holdings of undeveloped land17 which could be condemned without
incidental losses to the condemnee. When condemnation occurred the
customary result was a displacement of a settled family or business,
thereby causing greater public insistence for compensation for moving
expenses. The result was a very liberal system of compensation
awards that included payment of all incidental expenses, including
moving costs, as well as a ten per cent award for "general inconven-
ience."'' 8 The English practice was an attempt to make the condemnee
whole, rather than to pay for what the condemnor had physically
taken.19
The available English precedent was not followed in this country
because of the different geographic, economic and industrial matrix
of early America. Today the urban-rural ratio of the United States
has changed 0 andthe principle has emerged that every individual
is entitled to be made whole for losses he incurred as the "price"
that society must pay for progress and civilization.21 Moreover, an
ever increasing amount of condemnation is taking place in densely
populated areas for purposes such as urban development, highway
construction and mass transit projects.22 Procedures established to
determine compensation one hundred years ago, when the only real
17 See I NICHOLS § 1.22(1) at 53:
"When the settlement of the American colonies began, the situation in
respect to roads was just the reverse of what it was in England. There were
no roads, but the land was wholly unsettled and unimproved, and in many
cases not even allotted to private ownership, so that there was no difficulty in
acquiring a location for such roads. When thousands of square miles of arable
land was unused and unoccupied, unimproved land, although held in private
ownership, had no substantial value. No duty was at first recognized in any
of the colonies to compensate the owner when a road was laid through such
land, so long as that land was unimproved."
18 Eminent Domain Valuation supra note 2, at 66.
19 W. Rought, Ltd. v. West Suffolk County Council, [1955] 2 All E.R. 337
(Ct. App.).
20 In 1950, 64 per cent of the population of the United States lived in
urban areas; in 1960 the percentage had increased to 69.9 per cent. In Cali-
fornia it increased from 80.7 per cent to 86.4 per cent in the same ten year
period. In 1950, 89,317,000 United States residents lived in metropolitan areas
and 62,009,000 lived in non metropolitan areas; in 1966 the comparative figures
were 125,232,000 and 68,915,000. BUREAu or THm CENsus, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 17-18 (1968).
21 Cf. W. PRossrn, HAmBOOK OF LAW OF TORTS § 5, at 22-23 (3rd ed.
1964), which stresses the need of compromise between the conflicting interests
of certain favored industries, at a particular stage and development of society,
and the protection of the individual.
22 E.g., since 1947 the number of federal highway contracts have steadily
increased from 917 in 1947 to 5,512 in 1967. BuAnu or THE CENsus, STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 543 (1968).
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loss that the landowner incurred was the loss to virgin land, are in-
adequate for the present. Today, moving expenses of personal prop-
erty may figure significantly in the total cost of the condemnation
shouldered by the condemnee. In the past, however, the absence of
these important considerations resulted in theories of compensation
that included only payment for the market value of the property
taken. The lack of popular insistence that moving costs be included
also led to the exclusion of these expenses as part of the constitution-
ally protected interests guaranteed just compensation. Indeed, under
the conditions existing at the time the majority rule was established,
its application was just and did not cause hardship.
Justification of the Majority Rule
Too Hypothetical to be Included in Market Value
The most common measure of just compensation for property
taken in a condemnation proceeding has been the fair market value
formula, by which "every element which affects the value and which
would influence a prudent purchaser should be considered."2 3 The
formula is on the whole quite useful since it is based on a readily
ascertainable standard for determining compensation. However, it
does not entirely embody the nebulous requirement of "just" or "full"
compensation. It serves merely as a means to implement the constitu-
tional requirement, if the circumstances are such that fair and just
compensation does result.24
When the fair market value formula does not fully compensate
the landowner for the property taken it should be either discarded
or modified. Thus, in one case the court said:
This court and many others have often said that the measure of
damages is the market value of the property condemned ... and this
is undoubtedly the general rule, but this court has never held that the
rule is without exception and that cases may not arise where a proper
observance of the constitutional provision that private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public rule without just compensation
may not require the payment of damages actually sustained other than
those measured by the value of the property taken. . . . But may not
cases arise where the cost of removal of personal property from the
premises taken, and injury thereto, would exceed the value of the
property taken? ... Let it be supposed that the fair market value of
a certain piece of real estate sought to be condemned is of itself of
but small value, but that the property is occupied by the owner as the
site of a costly manufacturing plant, is covered with valuable and
complicated machinery, and that such machinery could not be re-
moved except at an expense greater than the value of the premises;
must the owner accept the value of the premises, and expend the
amount received and an additional sum in removing and repairing his
23 4 NIC oLs § 12.1, at 4, 5.
24 United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949), where the court looked at
market value not as compensation per se, but as a criterion for striking a
balance between the public need and the condemnee's loss.
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machinery?25
Outside of these unique circumstances that necessitate breaking
away from the fair market value formula, it appears that the formula
does not compensate for moving costs in the normal situation. In
making up the market value, all existing facts that enter into the value
of the land in the public estimation and tend to influence the minds of
sellers and buyers may be considered, so long as they are not based on
conjectural, hypothetical, or speculative assumptions.26 The hypo-
thetical and speculative nature of moving costs has been cited as a
reason for their exclusion as a separate item. 27 These same hypo-
thetical characteristics would likewise keep moving costs from being
reimbursed through the market value formula if they should enter
the formula on economically sound principles.
One way in which moving costs could be included in the market
value consideration would be to deny that they are conjectural. It
has already been recognized, even by courts, that they can be ascer-
tained with reasonable certainty.28 Furthermore, they are clearly not
more conjectural than countless other unknown factors that determine
fair market value.29 A more basic question is whether there is a
proper economic basis for including moving costs in the market value
formula. The courts that use the market value formula-basically a
test of how much a willing buyer would pay a willing seller-neglect
to consider the reluctancy of the prospective buyer to pay the in-
creased price that the seller will demand, as necessitated by the added
removal costs for which the seller will desire remuneration. 30 This is
25 Metropolitan W.S.E.R.R. v. Siegel, 161 IM. 638, 647, 44 N.E. 276, 280
(1896) (emphasis added).
26 Joint H'way Dist. No. 9 v. Ocean Shore R.R. Co., 128 Cal. App. 743,
18 P.2d 413 (1933).
27 E.g., In re Grantiot Ave, 294 Mich. 569, 577, 293 N.W. 755, 758 (1940);
see 4 NIcHOLS § 14.2471(2).
28 Los Gatos v. Sund, 234 Cal. App. 2d 24, 28, 44 Cal. Rptr. 181, 184
(1965), stated that "[w]e are mindful of appellants' argument that moving
costs, at least, could be ascertainable with reasonable certainty, thus eliminat-
ing the speculative feature which has been a reason against their allowance."
C. McCoRmIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 539 n.14 (1935), says that
"[t]he suggestion . . . is that there is uncertainty in that different owners
would move different distances. This seems hypercritical. The actual cost of
any move within a reasonable ambit is a criterion which offers little difficulty
on the scope of uncertainty."
29 E.g., Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1892); Sacramento S.
Ry. Co. v. Heibron, 156 Cal. 408, 104 P. 979 (1909) (potential use of property
condemned). 4 NICHOLS § 12.32, at 218, states that "[lt must, however, be
remembered that market value is always based upon hypothetical conditions."
(Emphasis added).
30 The court in Harvey Textile Co. v. Hill, 135 Conn. 686, 67 A.2d 851
(1949), used the market value approach to grant the condemnee moving costs
on the theory that such moving costs would always enter the bargaining be-
tween the willing seller and the willing buyer and hence be compensated
through the market value. For an unequivocal repudiation of the case, see
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especially true if there is similar vacant property available. Further-
more, the buyer also has moving costs which, if taken into considera-
tion, would neutralize the expenses to the seller. Therefore, the
"willing seller-willing buyer" test does not provide relief; the willing
buyer would not pay the seller's moving costs in the normal free
market under which the fair market value is determined.3 1 All this
leads to the conclusion that a strict adherence to the market value
formula will not remove the harshness caused by a refusal to com-
pensate for moving costs. Another approach is needed.
Compensation Not Guaranteed By Constitution
It has been argued that there is a constitutional limitation that
restricts the discretion of the judiciary in its determination of what is
"compensation.13 2  While it is true that compensation for moving
costs is not compensation for property taken, it does not follow that
these costs do not increase the amount of the condennee's loss. "In
other words, just compensation in the constitutional sense is what the
Highway Comm'n v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 204 Ore. 393, 420-21, 281 P.2d 707,
719-22 (1955). See 1 ORGEL § 70; C. McCoRMTcK, HANDBOOK OF = LAw OF
DAMAGES 541-42 (1935): "But courts have frequently said that loss of good
will, loss of business, and inconvenience from interruption, and cost of re-
moval also influence market value. Market value being either the actual
current price for like property or the hypothetical price at which a willing
seller and a willing buyer would meet each other's demands, can we say that
market value would be affected by these costs, so that a jury should be in-
structed to consider them in estimating such value? It is suggested that a
seller would be unwilling to sell except at a price which could cover, not
merely the amount at which he valued the land and buildings, but the inci-
dental losses of business and the expense and inconvenience which would re-
sult from the breaking up his establishment. It is submitted, however, that
this does not stand the test of sound economic theory. Regardless of the de-
sires of the seller, the purchaser will seek in the market the property which
meets his needs at the lowest price. In most instances, buildings temporarily
vacant, or occupied by tenants who are intending to vacate, which are suitable
to the purchaser's requirements, will be offered to him. These other sellers
will have no motive to demand a price which will cover the losses incidental to
removal, for the sale by them would have no such effect. They can afford to
offer their property at a price which includes no such items, and presumably
they will do so. Presumably, therefore, the purchaser will offer our seller,
who is facing removal expenses, no more than such purchaser would pay for
other equally desirable property. Consequently, it seems that, except in the
unusual instance of property which would be in demand from purchasers who
could not, because of an absence of available vacant property, supply their
needs except by buying land occupied by going business establishments, the
incidental losses mentioned cannot property be awarded, or even considered,
as an element of market value."
81 See Highway Comm'n v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 204 Ore. 393, 281 P.2d 707
(1955).
32 Cf. 4 NICHOLS § 14.2471(2), at 670.
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owner has lost, and not what the condemnor has gained.133
It would seem that "just compensation"' is such a broad social
concept that it could encompass any element leading to substantial
justice in eminent domain proceedings. Accordingly, the United
States Supreme Court has rejected restrictions upon the concept of
"just compensation":
The Court in its construction of the constitutional provision has been
careful not to reduce the concept of "just compensation" to a formula.
The political ethics reflected in the Fifth Amendment reject confisca-
tion as a measure of justice. But the Amendment does not contain
any definite standards of fairness by which the measure of "just com-
pensation" is to be determined.3 4
This would seem to remove sufficiently any constitutional restrictions
to the granting of moving expenses except that such expenses be
found to be within the substantial limits of "justice." Furthermore,
even if the courts interpret "just compensation" as not encompassing
moving expenses for personal property, the Supreme Court has ruled
that legislative bodies are competent to enlarge the judicial interpre-
tation of just compensation for property taken.
[W]hile the legislature was powerless to diminish the constitutional
measure of just compensation. . . no rule ... stands in the way of an
extension of it, within the limits of equity and justice, so as to include
rights otherwise excluded.... It is not forbidden to be just in some
cases where it is not required to be by the letter of paramount law.3 5
Compensation Is Too Expensive
Although generally suppressed as a reason for their denial, the
practical objection of excessive expense to the condemning authority
may overshadow all other reasons for a denial of moving expenses.
This has been suggested as the reason for the denial of moving ex-
penses, 30 as the allowance of moving costs allegedly would put a brake
33 4 NICHOLS § 12.21. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S.
189 (1910); State v. La Macchia, 41 Cal. 2d 738, 264 P.2d 15 (1953).
34 United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949). See also Idaho-Western
Ry. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 20
Ida. 568, 119 P. 60 (1911) (compensation for a college campus); First Parish
v. Middlesex County, 73 Mass. (7 Grey) 106 (1856) (compensation for a
church); Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. DuPree Co., 108 So.
2d 289 (Fla. 1959), further explained that the theory and spirit of the constitu-
tional requirement of full or just compensation for appropriation of private
property is one requiring a practical attempt to make the owner whole; a per-
son who is put to expense through no desire or fault of his own can only be
made whole when his reasonable expenses are included in compensation. This
is a drastic change from the holding of one of the earliest cases that determined
compensation, Commissioners of Momochitto River v. Withers, 29 Miss. 21
(1855). In Withers the court described compensable property as needing to be
"of a specific, fixed and tangible nature, capable of being had in possession
and transmitted to another, as houses, lands, and chattels." Id. at 32.
85 Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 676-77 (1923).
36 Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent
Domain, 48 VA. L.J. 437, 450 (1962).
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on many public projects that require the exercise of the eminent do-
main power.
Since there is a dearth of available material on moving expenses
actually paid,37 it is difficult to deny the possibility that the payment
of these expenses may result in excessive claims on condemnors. One
report has considered the actual costs of moving, however, and its
findings are noteworthy. Under a federal statute, up to 25 percent of
the fair market value of the condemned parcel of land is allowed for
moving expenses of personal property.38 Under this federal authority
[t]he Southern California office of the United States Army Corps of
Engineers had handled approximately 200 cases since the inception
of the moving cost reimbursement program. The average of resettle-
ment payments made by that office in these cases is between three
and four per cent of the acquisition cost, i.e., the appraisal value of
the properties acquired. This is an over-all average for farm, business,
residence and industrial acquisitions. Approximately 90 per cent of
the payments were less than $500.... There has been only one
instance when the claims for moving expenses of the interestholders
in the acquired property exceeded the 25 per cent limitation.39
Thus the limited statistics available do not bear out the fear of
greatly increased condemnation costs. Undoubtedly there would be
some increase in the costs to the taxpayer, but it does not seem that
the added costs would equal the hardship incurred by a small sector
of the population that suffer noncompensable losses for moving ex-
penses because of condemnation activities.
The Particular Plight of the Tenant
When the party that will incur moving costs is a lessee whose
leasehold interest has been condemned, reimbursement for such ex-
penses is denied on the rationale that eventually, at the expiration of
his lease, the tenant would have had to move anyway.40 Courts also
argue that moving expenses are merely one of the liabilities assumed
by placing personal property on leased premises.41 Thus, the con-
demnation action affects only the time at which such costs must be
incurred, rather than actually causing the expense to be incurred.
37 It is extremely difficult to obtain digested statistics of reimbursement
for property taken. Perhaps part of the difficulty stems from the numerous
agencies on federal, state, regional, and city levels that carry on eminent do-
main proceedings.
8 Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 726, § 401(b), 66 Stat. 606, 624.
39 3 CAL. LAW REviSION Comm'N, REPORTS, RECOmmENATIONs, & STUDIES
C-22 (1960).
40 In re Smith St. Bridge, 234 App. Div. 583, 588, 255 N.Y. Supp. 801, 808
(1932). An interesting argument is made in 36 Opr. L. REV. 180 (1957),
claiming that the general law that denies the fee owner compensation for
moving expenses for personal property arose out of a misapplication of the
rule relating to leasehold interests.
41 Springfield Sw. Ry. v. Schweitzer, 173 Mo. App. 650, 158 S.W. 1058(1913), contains a comprehensive review of the various reasons given for
denial to owners of leasehold interests.
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Regardless of the outward validity of this rationale, however, the
basic requirement of just compensation for property taken, whether
this property be leasehold or not, is not satisfied if the lessee is re-
quired to shoulder the payment of these moving costs himself. The
requirement of just compensation for property taken is focused upon
the loss to the condenmee rather than the taking by the condemnor.
On this basis there is no distinction between costs incurred by the
tenant and those incurred by the land owner.42 The exception would
be when the tenant was already under an obligation to move because
of the terms of his lease before notice of the condemnation was given
by the condemnee.
Moreover, it is not always true that the owner of a leasehold in-
terest would have to move eventually and that the taking, therefore,
merely changes the time at which such expenses would be incurred.
The tenant may never have had to move but for the condemnation
proceeding, and to rely on the assumption that he would have had to
move eventually seems fallacious. Renters and lessees are inconven-
ienced by condemnation as are land owners, and their expenses are no
less real.
It should be noted that if the costs of moving early due to con-
demnation are greater than they would have been otherwise, the
majority view is that the lessee has no right to compensation, not even
to the extent that those early-moving costs exceed moving costs that
would normally have been incurred.43 The denial of admitted addi-
tional expenses in such a case could not be based on the assumption
that the moving expenses would have been incurred eventually upon
completion of the leasehold estate. Rather, the denial would seem to
stem from the general reluctance to compensate for moving expenses.
Growing Minority View
In this decade there has been a movement toward making moving
expenses compensable, usually by enacting legislation allowing them
as part of the condemnation award. Pennsylvania "presents one of
the most comprehensive and well-thought-out statutory schemes in
this area .... 44
The person having legal possession shall be entitled to, as damages,
the reasonable moving expenses for personal property other than
machinery, equipment or fixtures, not to exceed five hundred dollars
($500), when personal property is moved from a place of residence
and not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) when
personal property is moved from a place of business. Receipts there-
for shall be prima facie evidence of reasonable moving expenses. A
42 Committee on Condemnation Law, Basis of Condemnation Awards, 1
REAL PROP, PROBATE AND TRuST JouRNAL 381, 398 (1966), queries this distinc-
tion: "Another curious distinction is made in Florida, where it has been held
that an owner may recover the costs of moving, whereas a lessee could not."
43 In re New York Cent. R.R., 42 N.Y.S.Ct.R. 306 (Hun 1885).
44 ABA REAL ESTATE, PROB. & TRUST L. PROC. pt. II, at 53 (1965).
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tenant shall be entitled to recover these moving expenses even though
he is not entitled to any of the proceeds of the condemnation. In no
event shall such expenses exceed the market value of such personal
property.45
Along with Pennsylvania's 1964 statutes, Massachusetts, 4 Minne-
sota,47 Nebraska,48 Washington,49 and Wisconsin,"° have, by broad
statutes, provided for the compensation of moving expenses. In Min-
nesota, compensation for moving expenses has not been phrased as a
matter of right, but as a discretionary action by the commissioners of
the particular condemning agency.51 In addition, while New York has
no broad statute providing for compensation of moving expenses in
all eminent domain proceedings, it does have provisions in specific
codes which allow compensation but do not make the payment obliga-
tory.5
2
The statutory approach of the above states has undoubtedly
served to provide more adequate compensation. However, all these
statutes have had serious quantitative limitations that are not realistic
in light of the actual expenses of moving personal property. Further-
more, as noted, not all the statutes make compensation obligatory,
and some apply only to fee owners or to tenants with an extended
lease.
In addition to those states attempting to provide for the payment
of moving expenses by statute, there are states that have approached
45 PA. STAT. AN. tit. 26, § 610 (Supp. 1967).
46 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 6A (Supp. 1967), provides reasonable
compensation for moving expenses within the commonwealth, but not in excess
of $3,000.00 from a place of business and $200.00 from a place of residence.
This provision is strengthened by a 1967 amendment making the granted
compensation not subject to attachment by trustee process or otherwise, nor
subject to be taken by execution or other process. Id. ch. 162, § 1 (Supp. 1967).
47 MIlN. STAT. § 117.20(8b) (1965), provides for damages for moving
expenses, but not to exceed $3,000.00 for non residential property and $200.00
for residential property.
48 NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-710.01 (Supp. 1965), merely says "such damage
shall include ... the reasonable cost of any necessary removal of personal
property from real estate being taken...." There appears to be no limitation
of any type.
49 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.25.040 (Rev. Supp. 1967), provides for rea-
sonable removal costs not to exceed $10,000.00 for business property and
$500.00 for residential property, if the amount of reimbursement does not
exceed the cost of moving one hundred miles from the point of displacement.
50 WIs. STAT. AN. § 32.19(2) (1964), provides for removal costs not to
exceed $2,000.00 from non residential sites and $150.00 from places of residence.
Leasehold interests, however, are not allowed compensation unless they are
written for a remaining term of three years.
51 MiNN. STAT. § 117.20(8b) (1965).
52 E.g., N.Y. CANAL LAw § 40(12b) (McKinney Supp. 1968); N.Y. H'WAY
LAw § 29 (13b) (McKinney Supp. 1966), which provides for reasonable reim-
bursement not to exceed $25,000.00 in cases of commercial property and
$300.00 in cases of residential property. These statutes apply only to personal
property and not to removable fixtures.
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the problem by judicial decision. The Connecticut decision of Harvey
Textile Company v. Hill53 allows reimbursement for all moving ex-
penses "on a rather unusual theory."54  It was argued in Harvey
Textile that a willing seller would always take into account the cost of
moving personal property in arriving at the market value at which
he would sell, and therefore such costs should be included in the
award. Although this decision was a valiant attempt at compen-
sating for the real injury of the condemnee, the theory used seems not
only unusual, but fallacious. Admittedly the court had more leeway
in reaching this decision since the relevant Connecticut statute speaks
of compensation for all damages, rather than for property taken.55
But the economic soundness of the inclusion of these costs in market
value is doubtful, as has been pointed out, since regardless of the de-
sires of the seller, the buyer will seek similar property that meets his
needs at the lowest price.
As recently as 1959, Florida adopted the minority rule in the
leading case of Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. Du
Pree Company5 6 where, without a statute, moving expenses were
allowed as a separate item outside of market value. The court argued
that market value is not the exclusive standard, but merely a tool to
assist in the determination of full compensation. 57  The court looked
into the theoretical basis for full and just compensation and concluded
that
[t]he theory and spirit of the constitutional requirement of full or
just compensation for appropriation of private property requires a
practical attempt to make the owner whole. A person who is put to
expense through no desire or fault of his own can only be made whole
when his reasonable expenses are included in compensation.8
Decisions in other jurisdictions have allowed moving expenses sporad-
ically, but their strength has been diminished by reliance on particular
53 135 Conn. 686, 67 A.2d 851 (1949).
54 Committee on Condemnation Law, Basis of Condemnation Awards, 1
REAL PROP. PRoB. & TRUST J., 381, 398 (1966).
55 CoNN. GEm. STAT. REv. § 1528 (1930); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 2264
(1949). To rest this decision on the particular wording of the statute is not
totally convincing, however, since the court used moving costs to determine
market value, not as an added factor. Harvey Textile Co. v. Hill, 135 Conn.
686, 67 A.2d 851 (1949). Regardless of what goes into its determination,
market value is the function of measurement that is followed in most states
whether the statute allows compensation for property "taken" or "damaged".
4 NicHOLS § 12.1, at 4, 5. If, on the other hand, the moving costs had been
allowed as a separate factor, the reliance on the particular wording would
have more basis.
56 108 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1959). But see Gross v. Ruskin, 133 So. 2d 759
(Fla. App. 1961); Romy v. Dade County, 114 So. 2d 8 (Fla. App. 1959);
Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 110 So. 2d 687
(Fla. App. 1959).
57 108 So. 2d at 291.
58 Id. at 292.
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constitutional or statutory language,59 or by special circumstances.6 0
California Law
California has always followed the majority rule that neither
tenants nor owners are entitled to reimbursement for moving costs.61
The decisions have adhered very closely to the market value formula:
"Where private property is taken for a public use, it is universally
agreed that the compensation required is to be measured by the mar-
ket value of the property taken. '62
There has been some movement away from the inflexible rule by
later decisions stating that market value is not synonymous with just
compensation, and that it is not the exclusive standard for computing
just compensation. 6 3 These cases affirm that just compensation is the
goal, but hold further that where the rigid application of a settled
rule does not work toward that goal, there must be a departure from
the rule to accommodate the circumstances of the case. Thus it would
seem that the door was left open for the inclusion of moving expenses
in the condemnation award. The 1965 decision of Los Gatos v. Sund, 4
however, refused to take the opportunity made available by those
earlier cases, but shut the door to any judicial relief by saying "we be-
lieve ... this argument is one to be adressed to the Legislature....
[I] t is not for us to change the established law."6 5
California is no longer burdened with the argument that moving
costs are too speculative and hypothetical to be considered for com-
pensation. This is one aspect of the confusion that the Los Gatos
decision resolved by stating: "[W] e are mindful of appellants' argu-
ment that moving costs, at least, could be ascertained with reasonable
certainty, thus eliminating the speculative feature which has been a
59 See Richmond v. Williams, 114 Va. 698, 77 S.E. 492 (1913), where the
statute allowed compensation for land taken "or other property"; Annot., 69
A.L.R. 2d 1445 (1960), where the cases are collected.
60 E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (tem-
porary taking).
61 Central Pac. R.R. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247 (1868); Los Gatos v. Sund,
234 Cal. App. 2d 24, 44 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1965); La Mesa v. Tweed & Gambrell
Mill, 146 Cal. App. 2d 762, 766, 304 P.2d 803, 811 (1956); Los Angeles County
v. Signal Realty Co., 86 Cal. App. 704, 712, 261 P. 536, 539 (1927).
62 Rose v. State, 12 Cal. 2d 713, 737, 123 P.2d 505, 519 (1942) (emphasis
added).
68 Citizens Util. Co. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 805, 826, 382 P.2d 356,
364, 31 Cal. Rptr. 316, 324 (1963); Napa Union High School Dist. v. Lewis, 158
Cal. App. 2d 69, 322 P.2d 39 (1958).
64 234 Cal. App. 2d 24, 44 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1965). The very early California
decision, Central Pac. R.R. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247 (1868), likewise left the
matter of compensation other than strict market value, in the hands of the
legislature. It is understandable, therefore, that no court has created a ju-
dicial remedy for moving expenses.
65 234 Cal. App. 2d at 28, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
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reason against their allowance. .... -"6 Granted this was only an
oblique acceptance of the argument that moving costs are real costs;
nevertheless, it was still a step in the right direction.
California Statutory Changes
In the last two years California has enacted some measures to
ease the burden of the condemnee. Government Code sections 15,950-
56 allow compensation for the "reasonable and necessary moving ex-
penses" 67 incurred when property is taken by either the Department
of Water Resources or the Department of Parks and Recreation. In
the case of household moving expenses, a ceiling of $200 is set by the
statute.68 The promulgation of rules and regulations necessary to
implement these payments is left to the discretion of the Department
of Public Works and the Board of Control.69 A similar provision is
made for reimbursement of moving expenses of condemnees displaced
by action of the State Highway Department in Streets and Highways
Code section 103.9. The same $200 ceiling is placed upon household
moving expenses, and the act is subject to the same discretionary
management by the Highway Department as were the Government
Code provisions. A better reasoned approach is provided by sections
29,110-17 of the Public Utilities Code which require that "the district
shall compensate eligible persons for their reasonable and necessary
moving expenses caused by their displacement from real property
acquired for such project."70 There is also a monetary ceiling of $200
in cases of the movement of a household under this provision.71
Section 33,135 of the Health and Safety Code allows some further
relief from the hardships caused by the relocation of persons displaced
by government action (which would normally arise from eminent do-
main proceedings). It provides that "an agency may, with the
approval of the Legislative body, provide relocation assistance to per-
sons displaced by governmental action, and aid and assistance to prop-
erty owners in connection with rehabilitation loans and grants. '72
It does appear, therefore, that there has been at least a recognition of
the existence of such customary hardships in these relocation situa-
tions for which some sort of general compensation is needed. This
statute is merely a broad guideline (if even that) of "relocation assist-
ance"; it is not a comprehensive program that is self-executing, but,
rather, one that operates on an ad hoc basis, requiring the advance
approval of the legislative body. It would therefore function at the
whim of each project and each legislature. Further, and most funda-
mental, there is no mandatory requirement of compensation once com-
66 Id.
67 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15,951.
68 Id. § 15,953.
69 Id. § 15,956.
70 CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 29,111.
71 CAL. PuB. UmL. CODE § 29,113.
72 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE: § 33,135 (emphasis added).
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pensation is adjudged allowable.
Aside from the monetary restrictions, and the fact that payments
are not compulsory, there is a further disadvantage in that not all
condemnation proceedings are covered.73 Whether to give compensa-
tion is determined by the fortuitous factor of which agency condemns
and for what project the condemnation occurs. This would seem to
interject unequal treatment for different persons that have all been
injured in the same manner. The better solution would be the
enactment of an all-encompassing statute of the type Pennsylvania
now possesses, which would allow adequate compensation for the ex-
pense of dismantling, removing, packing, loading, transporting, un-
loading, storing, unpacking, reassembling or installing personal prop-
erty and removable fixtures.
Statutory Recommendation
It is suggested that California should enact comprehensive legis-
lation providing for the compensation of moving costs when such ex-
penses are necessitated by the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main by a public agency. Such a statute should include:
(1) A general provision allowing compensation for the actual
necessary 74 costs of moving personal property to another location.
(2) A maximum limit of 50 miles' reimbursable transportation
expenses. 75 The condemnee could, of course, move further, but only
at his additional expense.
(3) No quantitative restriction on the allowable expenses, except
in the form of a percentage of the reasonable market value of the
personal property affected.7 6
(4) No distinction between fee owners and owners of leasehold
interests unless there existed written documentation that the lease-
73 If the condemnation does not fall under one of the selected codes, i.e.,
California Street and Highway Code or California Health and Safety Code,
there is no remedy to the condemnee for the recovery of his moving expenses.
74 A provision for actual costs incurred would be more desirable than a
provision for reasonable costs. Recovery under "reasonable" costs would
necessitate a subjective appraisal and it would give the condemnee an oppor-
tunity to make a profit on the necessitated moving.
75 Such a provision would enable the displaced person to have a large
area of choice within the geography of his former home. A 50-mile radius can
cover movement within any large metropolitan area and still allow movement
to a rural area, if such is the need.
76 Since moving expenses for personal property are roughly a function of
the value of the condemned property, this would be the most desirable way of
compensation. Any fixed dollar ceilings would not allow fair compensation
for those condemnees who have valuable personal property that is difficult to
move. A fixed percentage would further enable the condemning agency to
accurately determine the maximum cost of condemnation. A 25 percent
figure would adequately cover the major part of the moving expenses. See
text accompanying note 28 supra.
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holder (of whatever kind, even at will) had been informed prior to
the condemnation that his leasehold interest would be terminated
lawfully. Lawful occupation would serve as the criterion for receipt
of payment for moving expenses.
(5) Reimbursement for all moving and relocation expenses in
cases of temporary takings after which term the condemnee would be
allowed to return to possession. 7 These expenses would be greater
since they would include costs of moving out, relocating in another
area (or storing for a temporary period), and then moving back to the
original premises.
(6) A statutory resolution that the determination of market
value by the court or by the condemning authority does not include
moving expenses.
78
While it cannot be denied that the enactment of such a general
statute would increase total costs of condemnation, the added costs
would provide a more fair and constitutional compensation by includ-
ing losses that oftentimes are greater even than the physical loss of the
property itself. To classify moving expenses as damnum absque
injuria, imposes an inordinate proportion of the expense for public
projects on a few individuals. It is doubtful that allowance of moving
expenses would put a stop to governmental activity by making it too
costly.79 More importantly, the scope of just compensation, of which
moving expenses is only one factor, is basically a question of policy
and practicalities that can best be answered by legislative action.
Peter M. de Petra*
7 This has been the case law in the federal courts since United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 383 (1945).
78 There would be no fear of double payment, that is, payment as a
separate item and as a factor or market value.
79 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
* Member, Third Year Class
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